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Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron
Cass R. Sunstein* and Richard H. Thaler**
Abstract
The idea of libertarian paternalism might seem to be an oxymoron, but it is both
possible and legitimate for private and public institutions to affect behavior while also
respecting freedom of choice. Often people’s preferences are ill-formed, and their
choices will inevitably be influenced by default rules, framing effects, and starting points.
In these circumstances, a form of paternalism cannot be avoided. Equipped with an
understanding of behavioral findings of bounded rationality and bounded self-control,
libertarian paternalists should attempt to steer people’s choices in welfare-promoting
directions without eliminating freedom of choice. It is also possible to show how a
libertarian paternalist might select among the possible options and to assess how much
choice to offer. Examples are given from many areas, including savings behavior, labor
law, and consumer protection.
I.

Introduction

Consider two studies of savings behavior:
1. Hoping to increase savings by workers, several employers have adopted a
simple strategy. Instead of asking workers to elect to participate in a 401(k)
plan, workers will be assumed to want to participate in such a plan, and hence
they will be automatically enrolled unless they specifically choose otherwise.
This simple change in the default rule – from nonenrollment to enrollment -has produced dramatic increases in enrollment.1
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2. Rather than changing the default rule, some employers have provided their
employees with a novel option: Allocate a portion of their future wage
increases to savings. Employees who choose this plan are free to opt out at
any time. A large number of employees have agreed to try the plan, and only a
few have opted out. The result has been to produce significant increases in
savings rates.2
Libertarians embrace freedom of choice, and so they deplore paternalism.3
Paternalists are thought to be deeply skeptical of freedom of choice and to deplore
libertarianism.4 According to the conventional wisdom, libertarians cannot possibly
embrace paternalism. The idea of libertarian paternalism seems to be a contradiction in
terms.
Generalizing from the two studies just described, we intend to unsettle the
conventional wisdom here. We elaborate a form of paternalism, libertarian in spirit, that
should be acceptable to those who are firmly committed to freedom of choice on grounds
of either autonomy or welfare.5 Indeed, we urge that libertarian paternalism provides a
basis for both understanding and rethinking a number of areas of contemporary law,
including those aspects that deal with worker welfare, consumer protection, and the
family.6 In the process of defending these claims, we intend to make some objections to
widely held beliefs about both freedom of choice and paternalism.7 Our emphasis is on

Pensions: Plan Rules, Participant Decisions, and the Path of Least Resistance, in James M. Poterba, ed., 16
Tax Policy and the Economy 67 (2002).
2
Richard H. Thaler and Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase
Employee Saving, Journal of Political Economy (forthcoming 2003).
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See, e.g., David Boaz, Libertarianism: A Primer (1998).
4
See, e.g., Robert Goodin, Permissible Paternalism: In Defense of the Nanny State, 1 The Responsive
Community 42 (1991).
5
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some of the issues explored here. See Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, Am
Econ Rev (forthcoming).
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Our defense of libertarian paternalism is closely related to the arguments for "asymmetrical paternalism,"
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and Matthew Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for Asymmetric
Paternalism (unpublished draft, 2002). Camerer et al. urge that governments should consider a weak form
of paternalism, a form that attempts to help those who make mistakes, while imposing minimal costs on
those who are fully rational. Our paper, written in parallel, has similar motivations, though libertarian
paternalism may or may not be asymmetric in the sense identified by Camerer and his coauthors.
7
See, e.g., Dennis Thompson, Political Ethics and Public Office 154-5 (1990), which lists three criteria for
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the fact that in many domains, people lack clear, stable, or well-ordered preferences.
What they choose is a product of framing effects, starting points, and default rules,
leaving the very meaning of the term “preferences” unclear.
Consider the question whether to undergo a risky medical procedure. When
people are told, “Of those who have this procedure, 90 percent are alive after five years,”
they are far more likely to agree to the procedure than when they are told, “Of those who
have this procedure, 10 percent are dead after five years.”8 What, then, are the patient’s
“preferences” with respect to this procedure? Experience might be expected to solve this
problem, but doctors too are vulnerable to this framing effect.9 Or return to the question
of savings for retirement. It is now clear that if an employer requires employees to make
an affirmative election in favor of savings, with the default rule devoting 100 percent of
wages to current income, the level of savings will be far lower than if the employer
adopts an automatic enrollment program, from which employees are freely permitted to
opt out.10 Can workers then be said to have well-defined preferences about how much to
save? This simple example can be extended to many situations involving the behavior of
workers and consumers.
As the savings problem illustrates, the design features of both legal and
organizational rules have surprisingly powerful influences on the choices made by those
affected. We urge that such rules should be chosen with the explicit goal of improving the
welfare of the people affected by them. The libertarian aspect of our strategies lies in the
straightforward insistence that in general, people should be free to opt out of specified
arrangements if they choose to do so. Hence we do not aim to defend any approach that
blocks individual choices. The paternalistic aspect consists in the claim that it is
legitimate for private and public institutions to attempt to influence people’s behavior
even when third party effects are absent. In other words, we argue for self-conscious
efforts, by private and public institutions, to steer people’s choices in directions that will
improve their own welfare. In our understanding, a policy therefore counts as
and irreversible harm. We think that this account points in many sensible directions, but it neglects the
inevitable effects of default rules, starting points, and framing effects on choices.
8
See Donald Redelmeier, Paul Rozin, and Daniel Kahneman, Understanding Patients' Decisions, 270
JAMA 72, 73 (1993).
9
Id.
10
See below for details.
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"paternalistic" if it attempts to influence the choices of affected parties in a way that will
make choosers better off.11 Drawing on some well-established findings in behavioral
economics and cognitive psychology, we emphasize the possibility that in some cases
individuals make inferior decisions in terms of their own welfare -- decisions that they
would change if they had complete information, unlimited cognitive abilities, and no lack
of willpower.12 In fact the notion of libertarian paternalism might be complemented by
that of libertarian benevolence, by which starting points, framing effects, and default
rules are enlisted in the interest of vulnerable third parties, and we shall devote some
discussion to this possibility.
Libertarian paternalism is a relatively weak and nonintrusive type of paternalism,
because choices are not blocked or fenced off. In its most cautious forms, libertarian
paternalism imposes trivial costs on those who seek to depart from the planner’s
preferred option. But the approach we recommend nonetheless counts as paternalistic,
because private and public planners are not trying to track people’s anticipated choices,
but are self-consciously attempting to move people in directions that will promote their
welfare. Some libertarians are likely to have little or no trouble with our endorsement of
paternalism for private institutions; their chief objection is to paternalistic law and
government. But as we shall show, the same points that support welfare-promoting
private paternalism apply to government as well. It follows that one of our principal
targets is the dogmatic anti-paternalism of numerous analysts of law, including many
economists and economically oriented lawyers. We believe that this dogmatism is based
on a combination of a false assumption and two misconceptions.13
The false assumption is that almost all people, almost all of the time, make
choices that are in their best interest or at the very least are better, by their own lights,
11

For a similar definition, see Donald VanDeVeer, Paternalistic Intervention 22 (1986).
Bounded rationality and bounded will-power are described in Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan L Rev. 1471, 1477-79 (1998).
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See, e.g., Richard Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At Will, 51 U Chi L Rev 947 (1984). For a similar
complaint, see Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin, Studying Optimal Paternalism, As Illustrated by a
Model of Sin Taxes, Am. Econ. Rev. (forthcoming 2003): [E]conomists deserve to be taken seriously in
some policy debates only if we get more serious about notions of when and how people do and don’t
pursue their own best interests. To best contribute to debates over regulating private financial decisions, we
should study when financial decisions are based on fallacious statistical reasoning and study when selfcontrol problems lead people to borrow too heavily; to best contribute to debates over teenage smoking, we
12
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than the choices that would be made by third parties. This claim is either tautological, and
therefore uninteresting, or testable. We claim that it is testable and false, indeed
obviously false. Indeed we do not believe that anyone believes it on reflection. Suppose
that a chess novice were to play a game of chess against an experienced player.
Predictably the novice would lose precisely because he made inferior choices, choices
that could easily be improved by some helpful hints. More generally, how well people
choose is an empirical question, one whose answer is likely to vary across domains.14 As
a first approximation, it seems reasonable to say that people make better choices in
contexts in which they have experience and good information (say, choosing ice-cream
flavors) than in contexts in which they are inexperienced and ignorant (say, choosing
among medical treatments or investment options). So long as people are not choosing
perfectly, it is at least possible that some policy could make them better off by improving
their decisions.
The first misconception is that there are viable alternatives to paternalism. In
many situations, some organization or agent must make a choice that will affect the
behavior of some other people. There is, in those situations, no alternative to a kind of
paternalism -- at least in the form of an intervention that affects what people choose. We
are emphasizing, then, the possibility that people’s preferences, in certain domains and
across a certain range, do not predate the choices made by planners.15 The point applies
to both private and public actors, and hence to those who design legal rules as well as to
those who serve consumers. As a simple example, consider the cafeteria at some
organization. The cafeteria must make a multitude of decisions, including which foods to
ought to consider reasons to believe that teenagers might become smokers against their own long-run best
interest.”
14
In some areas, of course, it will be difficult to reach uncontroversial conclusions on the basis of empirical
study alone, because contested judgments of value are in the background. Do people choose well if they
choose to marry young, or do they choose better if they cohabit for a long time before marrying? Do young,
unmarried women choose well if they choose abortion? Empirical issues are highly relevant here, but they
will hardly resolve all social disputes on these questions. We are not attempting to say anything
controversial about welfare here, or to take sides in reasonable disputes about how to understand that term.
For discussion, see Amartya Sen, Development As Freedom (1999); Well-Being: The Foundations of
Hedonic Psychology (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds. 1998).
15
For claims to this effect, see Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83
Cornell L. Rev. 608 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. Legal
Stud. 217 (1993). Important qualifications come from Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law (1992),
discussing settings in which people organize their affairs without reference to law. But even with those
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serve, which ingredients to use, and in what order to arrange the choices. Suppose that the
director of the cafeteria notices that its customers have a tendency to choose more of the
items that are presented earlier in the line. How should the director decide in what order
to present the items? To simplify, consider some alternative strategies that the director
might adopt in deciding which items to “feature” early in the line:
1. She could make choices that she thinks would make the customers best off, all
things considered.
2. She could make choices at random.
3. She could choose those items that she thinks would make the customers as
obese as possible.
4. She could give consumers what she thinks they would choose on their own.
Option 1 appears to be paternalistic, but would anyone advocate options 2 or 3?
Option 4 is what anti-paternalists would favor, but it is much harder to implement than it
might seem. Across a certain domain of possibilities, consumers will often lack wellformed preferences, in the sense of preferences that are firmly held and preexist the
directors’ own choices about how to order the relevant items. If the arrangement of the
alternatives has a significant effect on the selections the customers make, then their true
“preferences” do not formally exist.
Of course market pressures will impose a discipline on the choices of cafeteria
directors, and to that extent, those directors must indeed provide people with what they
want. A cafeteria who faces competition and offers healthy but terrible-tasting food is
unlikely to do well. But some of the time, market success will come not from tracking
people’s ex ante preferences, but from providing goods and services that turn out, in
practice, to promote their welfare, all things considered. Consumers might be surprised
by what they end up liking; indeed, their preferences might change as a result of
consumption.16 And in some cases, the discipline imposed by market pressures will
nonetheless allow the director a great deal of room to maneuver, because people’s
preferences are not well-formed across the relevant domains.

qualifications, there is no objection to libertarian paternalism; in the contexts explored by Ellickson, the
default rule is irrelevant, not harmful.
16
See Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (1997).
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Some libertarians will happily accept this point for private institutions. Their
objection will be to government efforts to reject choice in the name of welfare.
Skepticism about government might be based on the fact that governments are disciplined
less or perhaps not at all by market pressures. Or such skepticism might be based on the
fear that parochial interests will drive government in their preferred directions (the public
choice problem17). We agree that for government, the risks of mistake and overreaching
are real and sometimes serious. But governments, no less than cafeterias (which
governments frequently run), have to provide starting points of one or another kind; this
is not avoidable. As we shall emphasize, they do so every day through the rules of
contract and tort, in a way that inevitably affects some preferences and choices.18 In this
respect, the antipaternalist position is unhelpful, a literal nonstarter.
The second misconception is that paternalism always involves coercion. As the
cafeteria example illustrates, the choice of the order in which to present food items does
not coerce anyone to do anything, yet one might prefer some orders to others on grounds
that are paternalistic in the sense that we understand the term. Would anyone object to
putting the fruit and salad before the desserts at an elementary school cafeteria if the
result was to increase the consumption ratio of apples to Twinkies? Is this question
fundamentally different if the customers are adults? Since no coercion is involved, we
think that some types of paternalism should be acceptable to even the most ardent
libertarian. In the important domain of savings behavior, we shall offer a number of
illustrations. To those antilibertarians who are suspicious of freedom of choice and would
prefer to embrace welfare instead, we urge that it is often possible for paternalistic
planners to make common cause with their libertarian adversaries, by adopting policies
that promise to promote welfare but that also make room for freedom of choice. To
confident planners, we suggest that the risks of confused or ill-motivated plans are
reduced if people are given the opportunity to reject the planner’s preferred solutions.
The thrust of our argument is that the term paternalistic should not be considered
pejorative, just descriptive. Once it is understood that some organizational decisions are
inevitable, that a form of paternalism cannot be avoided, and that the alternatives to
17

For a classic illustration, see Bruce A. Ackerman and William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air (1983).
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paternalism (such as choosing options to make people worse off) are unattractive, we can
abandon the less interesting question of whether to be paternalistic or not, and turn to the
more constructive question of how to choose among the possible choice-influencing
options. To this end we make two general suggestions about how to think about these
problems. First, programs should be designed using a type of cost-benefit analysis, one in
which a serious attempt is made to measure the costs and benefits of outcomes (rather
than estimates of willingness to pay). Choosers should be given more choices if the
benefits exceed the costs. Second, some results from the psychology of decision making
should be used to provide some ex ante guidelines to support reasonable judgments about
when consumers will gain most by choosing for themselves. We argue that those who are
generally inclined to oppose paternalism should consider these suggestions
uncontroversial.
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. In Part II, we briefly
support the claim that people’s choices might not promote their own welfare. Part III, in
some ways the conceptual heart of the Article, asks whether a form of paternalism is
inevitable. We suggest that because of the likely effects of default rules, framing effects,
and starting points on choices and preferences, paternalism, at least in a weak sense, is
impossible to avoid. To be sure, planners can try to avoid paternalism by coercing people
to make choices, but sometimes people will resist that coercion (which is along one
dimension paternalistic too, simply because people sometimes do not want to choose).
Part IV investigates how a libertarian paternalist might select among the major options,
including minimal paternalism, coerced choices, procedural constraints, and substantive
constraints. Part V explores a large question: How much choice should be offered? We
identify a set of questions that must be answered in order to know people’s welfare is
likely to be promoted or instead undermined by a large option set. Part VI explores
objections.

18

See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 608
(1998).
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II. The Rationality of Choices
The presumption that individual choices should be respected is usually based on
the claim that people do an excellent job of making choices, or at least that they do a far
better job than third parties could possibly do.19 As far as we can tell, there is little
empirical support for this claim, at least if it is offered in this general form. Return to the
issue of obesity. Rates of obesity in the United States are now approaching 20 percent
and over 60 percent of Americans are considered either obese or overweight.20 There is
overwhelming evidence that obesity causes serious health risks, frequently leading to
premature death.21 It is quite fantastic to suggest that everyone is choosing the optimal
diet, or a diet that is preferable to what might be produced with third party interference.
Of course rational people care about the taste of food, not simply about health, but the
claim that Americans are choosing diets optimally would be hard to support. What is true
19

It is usually, but not always, based on this assumption. Some of the standard arguments against
paternalism rest not on consequences but on autonomy – on a belief that people are entitled to make their
own choices even if they err. Thus John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, On
Liberty, Considerations on Representative Government 73 (H.B. Acton ed. 1972), is a mix of autonomybased and consequentialist claims. Our principal concern here is with welfare and consequences, though as
we suggest below, freedom of choice is sometimes an ingredient in welfare. We do not disagree with the
view that autonomy has claims of its own, but we believe that it would be fanatical, in the settings that we
discuss, to treat autonomy, in the form of freedom of choice, as a kind of trump, not to be overridden on
consequentialist grounds. In any case the autonomy argument is undermined by the fact, discussed in
section II, that sometimes preferences and choices are a function of given arrangements. Most important,
we think that respect for autonomy is adequately accommodated by the libertarian aspect of libertarian
paternalism, as discussed below.
We note as well that the complex relationship between preferences, choices, and autonomy is a
large theme in the liberal tradition. See Jon Elster, Sour Grapes (1983); Don Herzog, Happy Slaves (1989).
Sometimes it is emphasized that preferences and choices are a product of unjust background conditions,
jeopardizing autonomy, and that when choices are a product of background injustice, respect for those
choices need not promote autonomy. See Amartya Sen, Commodities and Capabilities (1986). Our
discussion does not engage these issues, but there is a clear connection between such arguments, and claims
about “adaptive preferences,” see Elster, supra, and our emphasis on status quo bias and the endowment
effect. See below.
20
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/trend/maps/. This represents a 61 percent increase in obesity
between 1991 and 2000; 38.8 million Americans qualify as obese. See also AH Mokdad et al., The
continuing epidemics of obesity and diabetes in the United States, 286 JAMA 1195 (2001) (discussing
increase in obesity).
21
See, e.g., E.E. Calle et al. Body-mass Index and Mortality in a Prospective Cohort of U.S. adults, 341
New England Journal of Medicine 1095 (1999). According to the federal government, “Approximately
280,000 adult deaths in the United States each year are related to obesity. Several serious medical
conditions have been linked to obesity, including type 2 diabetes, heart disease, high blood pressure, and
stroke. Obesity is also linked to higher rates of certain types of cancer. Obese men are more likely than
non-obese men to die from cancer of the colon, rectum, or prostate. Obese women are more likely than
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for diets is true as well for much other risk-related behavior, including smoking and
drinking, which produce over 500,000 premature deaths each year.22 In these
circumstances, people’s choices cannot reasonably be thought, in all domains, to
maximally promote their well-being.
On a more scientific level, research by psychologists and economists over the past
three decades has raised questions about the rationality of many judgments and decisions
that individuals make. People fail to make forecasts that are consistent with Bayes’ rule,23
use heuristics that lead them to make systematic blunders,24 exhibit preference reversals
(that is, they prefer A to B and B to A),25 suffer from problems of self-control,26 and
make different choices depending on the wording of the problem.27 It is possible to raise
questions about some of these findings and to think that people may do a better job of
choosing in the real world than they do in the laboratory. But studies of actual choices
reveal many of the same problems, even when the stakes are high.28

non-obese women to die from cancer of the gallbladder, breast, uterus, cervix, or ovaries.” See
http://www.niddk.nih.gov/health/nutrit/pubs/unders.htm#Healthrisks.
22
See Cass R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason 8-9 (2002). For an interesting discussion, see Jonathan Gruber,
Smoking’s “Internalities,” Regulation 52 (Winter 2002-2003).
23
See David Grether, Bayes’ Rule as a Descriptive Model: The Representativeness Heuristic, 95 Quarterly
Journal of Economics 537 (1980).
24
See, e.g., Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, 5 Cog Psych 207 (1973); Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 Science 1124 (1974); Daniel Kahneman and Shane Frederick,
Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment in Heuristics and Biases; The
Psychology of Intuitive Judgment 49 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds. 2002).
25
See Richard Thaler, The Winner’s Curse 79-91 (1992); in the legal context, see Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel
Kahneman, David Schkade, and Ilana Ritov, Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 Stan L Rev. 1153
(2002).
26
Shane Frederick, Ted O’Donoghue and George Loewenstein, Time Discounting and Time Preference: A
Critical Review , 40 Journal of Economic Literature 351 (2002).
27
See Colin Camerer, Prospect Theory in the Wild, in Choices, Values, and Frames 294-95 (Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky eds. 2000); Eric Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and
Insurance Decisions, in id. at 224, 238.
28
For evidence that heuristics and biases operate in the real world, even when dollars are involved, see
Werner F. M. De Bondt and Richard H. Thaler, Do Security Analysts Overreact? 80 American Economic
Review 52 (1990) ; Robert Shiller, Irrational Exuberance 136-147 (2000) (discussing anchoring and
overconfidence in market behavior); Colin Camerer and Robin Hogarth, The Effects of Financial
Incentives in Experiments, 19 J. Risk and Uncertainty 7 (1999), which finds that financial incentives have
never eliminated anomalies or persistent irrationalities. See also Colin Camerer , Behavioral Game Theory
60-62 (2003), finding little effects from increased stakes in ultimatum games (designed to test the
hypothesis that people are self-interested), and adding: “If I had a dollar for every time an economist
claimed that raising the stakes would drive ultimatum behavior toward self-interest, I’d have a private jet
on standby all day.” Id. at 60.
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We do not intend to outline all of the relevant evidence here, but consider an
illustration from the domain of savings behavior. Benartzi and Thaler investigate how
much investors like the portfolios they have selected in their defined contribution savings
plans.29 Employees volunteered to share their portfolio choices with the investigators (by
bringing a copy of their most recent statement to the lab). They were then shown the
probability distributions of expected retirement income for three investment portfolios
simply labeled A, B and C. Unbeknownst to the subjects, the three portfolios were their
own and portfolios mimicking the average and median choices of their fellow employees.
The distributions of expected returns were computed using the software of Financial
Engines, the financial information company founded by William Sharpe. On average, the
subjects rated the average portfolio equally with their own portfolio, and judged the
median portfolio to be significantly more attractive than their own.30 Indeed, only 20
percent of the subjects preferred their own portfolio to the median portfolio.31
Apparently, people do not gain much, by their own lights, from choosing investment
portfolios for themselves.
Or consider people’s willingness to take precautions. In general, the decision to
buy insurance for natural disasters is a product not of a systematic inquiry into either
costs and benefits, but of recent events.32 If floods have not occurred in the immediate
past, people who live on flood plains are far less likely to purchase insurance.33 In the
aftermath of an earthquake, the level of insurance for earthquakes rises sharply – but it
declines steadily from that point, as vivid memories recede.34 Findings of this kind do not
establish that people’s choices are usually bad or that third parties can usually do better.
But they do show that some of the time, people do not choose wisely even when the
stakes are high.
It is true that people sometimes respond to their own bounded rationality, for
example by hiring agents or by delegating decisions to others.35 It is also true that
29

See Shlomo Benartzi and Richard Thaler, How Much is Investor Autonomy Worth?, 57 Journal of
Finance 1593 (2002).
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk 40 (2000).
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
See Cass R. Sunstein and Edna Ullmann-Margalit , Second-Order Decisions, 110 Ethics 5 (1999).
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learning frequently occurs and enables people to overcome their own limitations. But
many of the most important decisions people make (e.g., buying a home, choosing a
spouse) are made infrequently and typically without the aid of impartial experts. The
possibilities of delegation and learning are insufficient to ensure that people’s choices
always promote their welfare or that they always do better than third parties would. In
any event our emphasis here is not on blocking choices, but on strategies that move
people in welfare-promoting directions while also allowing freedom of choice. Evidence
of bounded rationality, and of problems of self-control, is sufficient to suggest that such
strategies are worth exploring. Of course many people value freedom of choice as an end
in itself, but they should not object to approaches that preserve that freedom while also
promising to improve people’s lives.36
III. Is Paternalism Inevitable?
A few years ago, the tax law was changed so that employees could pay for
employer-provided parking on a pre-tax basis.37 Previously, such parking had to be paid
for with after-tax dollars. Our employer, and the employer of some of our prominent antipaternalistic colleagues, sent around an announcement of this change in the law, and
adopted the following policy: Unless the employee notified the payroll department,
deductions for parking would be taken from pre-tax rather than post-tax income. In other
words, the University of Chicago decided that the default option would be to pay for
parking with pre-tax dollars, but employees could opt out of this arrangement and pay
with after-tax dollars. Call this choice Plan A. An obvious alternative, Plan B, would be
to announce the change in the law and tell employees that if they want to switch to the
new pre-tax plan they should return some form electing this option. The only difference
between the two plans is the default. Under Plan A the new option is the default whereas
under Plan B the status quo is the default. We will refer to the former as “opt-out”
strategies and the latter as “opt-in” strategies.

36
37

See note supra (discussing freedom of choice as part of autonomy).
IRS Code Section 132(f).
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How should the university choose between opt-in and opt-out? In the specific
parking example, it seems to be the case that every employee would prefer to pay for
parking with pretax dollars rather than post-tax dollars. Since the cost savings are
substantial (parking costs as much as $1200 per year) and the cost of returning a form is
trivial, standard economic theory predicts that the university’s choice will not really
matter. Under either plan, all employees would choose (either actively or by default
under Plan A) the pretax option. In real life, however, had the university adopted Plan B,
we suspect that many employees, especially faculty members (and probably including the
present authors), would still have that form buried somewhere in their office and would
be paying substantially more for parking on an after-tax basis. In short, the default plan
would have had large effects on behavior. Throughout we shall be drawing attention to
the effects of default plans on choices. Often those plans will be remarkably sticky.
A. Savings and Employers
1. Data. Our conjecture is supported by the outcome of numerous experiments
documenting a “status quo” bias.38 The existing arrangement, whether set out by private
institutions or by government, is often robust. One illustration of this phenomenon comes
from studies of automatic enrollment in 401(k) employee savings plans,39 and we now
elaborate the brief account with which we began. Most 401(k) plans use an opt-in design.
When employees first become eligible to participate in the 401(k) plan, they receive some
plan information and an enrollment form that must be completed in order to join. Under
the alternative of automatic enrollment, employees receive the same information but are
told that unless they opt out, they will be enrolled in the plan (with some default options
for savings rates and asset allocation). In companies that offer a “match” (the employer
matches the employee’s contributions according to some formula, often a 50% match up
to some cap), most employees eventually do join the plan, but enrollments occur much
38
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sooner under automatic enrollment. For example, Madrian and Shea found that initial
enrollments jumped from 49% to 86%,40 and Choi et al. find similar results for other
companies.41
Should the adoption of automatic enrollment be considered paternalistic? And if
so, should it be seen as a kind of officious meddling with employee preferences? We
answer these questions yes and no respectively. If employers think (correctly we believe)
that most employees would prefer to join the 401(k) plan if they took the time to think
about it and did not lose the enrollment form, then by choosing automatic enrollment they
are acting paternalistically by our definition of the term. They are attempting not to track
the employee’s ex ante preferences or to protect against harms to third parties, but to steer
employees’ choices in directions that will, in their view, promote employees’ welfare.
Since no one is forced to do anything, we think that this steering should be considered
unobjectionable even to committed libertarians. The employer must choose some set of
rules, and either plan affects employees’ choices. No law of nature says that in the
absence of an affirmative election by employees, 0 percent of earnings will go into a
retirement plan. Because both plans alter choices, neither one can be said, more than the
other, to count as a form of objectionable meddling.
2. Skeptics. Skeptical readers, insistent on freedom of choice, might be tempted to
think that there is a way out of this dilemma. Employers could avoid choosing a default if
they required employees to make a choice, either in or out. Call this option coerced
choosing. Undoubtedly coerced choosing is attractive in some settings, but a little thought
reveals that this is not at all a way out of the dilemma. On the contrary, coerced choosing
is simply another option among many that the employer can elect. In fact the very
requirement that employees make a choice has a strong paternalistic element. Many
employees do not want to have to make a choice (and might make a second-order choice

Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules, Participant Decisions, and the Path of Least Resistance, in James M.
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not to have to do so). Why should employers force them to choose? Coerced choosing
respects freedom of choice in a certain respect; but it does not appeal to those who would
choose not to choose, and indeed it will seem irritating and perhaps unacceptably
coercive by their lights. In any case an empirical question remains: What is the effect of
forced choosing? Choi et al. find that coerced choosing increases enrollments relative to
the opt-in rule, though by not as much as automatic enrollment.42 Our discussion in
section IV below offers some suggestions about the circumstances in which it makes
most sense to force people to choose.
Other skeptics might think that employers should avoid paternalism by doing
what most employees would want employers to do. On this approach, a default rule can
successfully avoid paternalism if it tracks employees’ choices. Sometimes this is a
plausible solution. But what if many or most employees do not have stable or wellformed preferences, and what if employee choices are inevitably a product of the default
rule? In such cases, it is meaningless to ask what most employees would do. The choices
employees will make depend on the way the employer frames those choices. Employee
“preferences,” as such, do not exist in those circumstances. We think that across a certain
domain of reasonable possibilities, this is the situation with respect to savings. Of course
most people would not like 99 percent of their income to go to savings, and no effort to
frame choices is likely to lead people to choose to save at that level. But across a range of
allocations, many employees lack well-forced preferences that are robust to different
starting points.
B. Government
Some enthusiasts for free choice might be willing to acknowledge these points
and hence to accept private efforts to steer people’s choices in what seem to be the right
directions. Market pressures, and the frequently wide range of possible options, might be
thought to impose sufficient protection against objectionable steering. But our emphasis
has been on the inevitability of paternalism, and on this count, the same points apply to
some choices made by governments in establishing legal rules.
42

See note supra.
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1. Default rules. Default rules of some kind are inevitable, and much of the time,
those rules will affect preferences and choices.43 In the neglected words of a classic
article, a “minimum of state intervention is always necessary. . . . When a loss is left
where it falls in an auto accident, it is not because God so ordained it. Rather it is because
the state has granted the injurer an entitlement to be free of liability and will intervene to
prevent the victim’s friends, if they are stronger, from taking compensation from the
injurer.”44 If the entitlement-granting rules seem invisible, and to be a simple way of
protecting freedom of choice, it is because they appear so sensible and natural that they
are not taken to be a legal allocation at all. But this is a mistake. What we add here is that
when a default rule affects preferences and behavior, it is having the same effect as
employer presumptions about savings plans. This effect is often significant. So long as
people can contract around the default rule, it is fair to say that the legal system is
protecting freedom of choice, and in that sense complying with libertarian goals.
Consumers, workers, and married people,45 for example, are surrounded by a
network of legal allocations that provide the background against which agreements are
made. As a matter of employment law, and consistently with freedom of contract,
workers might be presumed subject to discharge “at will,” or they might be presumed to
be protected by an implied right to be discharged only “for cause.” They might be
presumed to have a right to vacation time, or not. They might be presumed to be
protected by safety requirements, or the employer might be free to invest in safety as he
wishes, subject to market pressures. In all cases, the law must establish whether workers
have to “buy” certain rights from employers or vice versa.46 Legal intervention, in this
important sense, cannot be avoided. The same is true for consumers, spouses, and all
others who are involved in legal relationships. Much of the time, the legal background
matters, even if transactions costs are zero, because it affects choices and preferences.47
Here, as in the private context, a form of paternalism is unavoidable.
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In the context of insurance, an unplanned, natural experiment showed that the
default rule can be very “sticky.”48 New Jersey created a system in which the default
insurance program for motorists included a relatively low premium and no right to sue;
purchasers were allowed to deviate from the default program and to purchase the right to
sue by choosing a program with that right and also a higher premium. By contrast,
Pennsylvania offered a default program containing a full right to sue and a relatively high
premium; purchasers could elect to switch to a new plan by “selling” the more ample
right to sue and paying a lower premium. In both cases, the default rule tended to stick. A
strong majority accepted the default rule in both states, with only about 20% of New
Jersey drivers acquiring the full right to sue, and 75% of Pennsylvanians retaining that
right.49 There is no reason to think that the citizens of Pennsylvania have systematically
different preferences from the citizens of New Jersey. The default plan is what produced
the ultimate effects. And indeed controlled experiments find the same results, showing
that the value of the right to sue is much higher when it is presented as part of the default
package.50
In another example, a substantial effect from the legal default rule was found in a
study of second-year and third-year law student reactions to different state law provisions
governing vacation time from firms.51 The study was intended to be reasonably realistic,
involving as it did a pool of subjects to whom the underlying issues were hardly foreign.
Advanced law students have devoted a good deal of time to thinking about salaries,
vacation time, and the tradeoffs among them. The study involved two conditions. In the
first, state law guaranteed two weeks of vacation time, and students were asked to state
their median willingness to pay (in reduced salary) for two extra weeks of vacation.52 In
this condition, the median willingness to pay was $6000. In the second condition, state
law provided a mandatory, nonwaivable two-week vacation guarantee, but it also
provided employees (including associates at law firms) with the right to two additional
48
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weeks of vacation, a right that could be “knowingly and voluntarily waived.” Hence the
second condition was precisely the same as the first, except that the default rule favored
the two extra weeks of vacation. In the second condition, students were asked how much
employers would have to pay them to give up their right to the two extra weeks. All by
itself, the switch in the default rule more than doubled the students’ responses, producing
a median willingness to accept of $13,000.53
We can imagine countless variations on these experiments. For example, the law
might authorize a situation in which employees have to opt into retirement plans, or it
might require employers to provide automatic enrollment and allow employees to opt in.
Both systems would respect the freedom of employees to choose, and thus either system
would be libertarian in that sense. In the same vein, the law might assume that there is no
right to be free from age discrimination in employment, permitting employees (through
individual negotiation or collective bargaining) to contract for that right -- or it might
give employees a nondiscrimination guarantee, subject to waiver via contract. Our
suggestion here is that one or another approach is likely to have effects on the choices of
employees. This is the sense in which paternalism is inevitable, from government no less
than from private institutions.
2. Anchors. In emphasizing the absence of well-formed preferences, we are not
speaking only of default rules. Consider the crucial role of “anchors,” or starting points,
in contingent valuation studies, an influential method of valuing regulatory goods, such
as increased safety and environmental protection.54 Such studies, used when market
valuations are unavailable, attempt to ask people their “willingness to pay” for various
regulatory benefits.55 Contingent valuation has become prominent in regulatory theory
and practice.56 Because the goal is to elicit what people actually want, contingent
valuation studies are an effort to elicit, rather than to affect, people’s values. Paternalism,
in the sense of effects on preferences and choices, is not supposed to be part of the
picture. But it is extremely difficult for contingent valuation studies to avoid constructing
53
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the very values that they are supposed to discover.57 The reason is that in the contexts in
which such studies are used, people do not have clear or well-formed preferences, and
hence it is unclear that people have straightforward “values” that can actually be found.58
Hence a form of paternalism verges on the inevitable.
Perhaps the most striking evidence to this effect comes from a study of
willingness to pay to reduce annual risks of death and injury in motor vehicles.59 The
authors attempted to elicit both maximum and minimum willingness to pay for safety
improvements. People were presented with a statistical risk and an initial monetary
amount, and asked whether they were definitely willing or definitely unwilling to pay that
amount to eliminate the risk, or if they were “not sure.” If they were definitely willing,
the amount displayed was increased until they said that they were definitely unwilling. If
they were unsure, the number was moved up and down until people could identify the
minimum and maximum.
The authors were not attempting to test the effects of anchors; on the contrary,
they were alert to anchoring only because they “had been warned” of a possible problem
with their procedure, in which people “might be unduly influenced by the first amount of
money that they saw displayed.”60 To solve that problem, the authors allocated people
randomly to two subsamples, one with an initial display of 25 pounds, the other with an
initial display of 75 pounds. The authors hoped that the anchoring effect would be small,
with no significant consequences for minimum and maximum values. But their hope was
dashed. For every level of risk, the minimum willingness to pay was higher, with the 75
pound starting point, than the maximum willingness to pay with the 25 pound starting
point!61 For example, a reduction in the annual risk of death by 4 in 100,000 produced a
maximum willingness to pay of 149 pounds with the 25 pound starting value, but a
minimum willingness to pay of 232 pounds with the 75 pound starting value (and a
maximum, in that case, of 350 pounds).62 The most sensible conclusions are that people
57
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are sometimes uncertain about appropriate values, and whenever they are, anchors have
an effect, and sometimes a startlingly large one.
It is not clear how those interested in eliciting (rather than affecting) values might
respond to this problem.63 What is clear is that in the domains in which contingent
valuation studies are used, people often lack well-formed preferences, and starting points
have important consequences for behavior and choice.
3. Framing. We have suggested that in the important context of medical decisions,
framing effects are substantial.64 Apparently most people do not have clear preferences
about how to evaluate a procedure that leaves 90 percent of people alive (and 10 percent
of people dead) after a period of years. A similar effect has been demonstrated in the
important context of obligations to future generations,65 a much-disputed policy
question.66 This question does not directly involve paternalism, because those interested
in the valuation of future generations are not attempting to protect people from their own
errors. But a regulatory system that attempts to track people’s preferences would try to
measure intergenerational time preferences, that is, to elicit people’s judgments about
how to trade off the protection of current lives and future lives.67 Hence an important
question, asked in many debates about the issue, is whether people actually make such
judgments and whether they can be elicited. And indeed, an influential set of studies finds
that people value the lives of those in the current generation far more than the lives of
those in future generations.68 From a series of surveys, Maureen Cropper and her
coauthors suggest that people are indifferent between savings one life today and saving
45 lives in 100 years.69 They make this suggestion on the basis of questions asking people
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whether they would choose a program that saves “100 lives now” or a program that saves
a substantially larger number “100 years from now.”70
But it turns out that other descriptions of the same problem yield significantly
different results.71 Here, as in other contexts, it is unclear whether people actually have
well-formed preferences with which the legal system can work. For example, most
people consider “equally bad” a single death from pollution next year and a single death
from pollution in 100 years72 -- implying no preference for members of the current
generation. In another finding of no strong preference for the current generation, people
are equally divided between two programs: one that will save 55 lives now and 105 more
lives in twenty years; and one that will save 100 lives now and 50 lives 25 years from
now.73 It is even possible to frame the question in such a way as to find that future lives
are valued more, not less, highly than current lives.74 The most sensible conclusion is that
people do not have robust, well-ordered intergenerational time preferences. If so, it is not
possible for government to track those preferences, because they are an artifact of how
the question is put.
C. Explanations
Why, exactly, do default rules, starting points, and framing effects have such large
effects? To answer this question, it is important to make some distinctions.
1. Suggestion. In the face of uncertainty about what should be done, people
might rely on one of two related heuristics: do what most people do, or do
what informed people do.75 The default plan or value might be presumed to
capture one or the other. In many settings, any starting point will carry some
70
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informational content and hence will affect choices. Hence if a default rule
affects behavior, it might well be because it is taken to carry information
about how sensible people usually organize their affairs. Notice that in the
context of savings, people might have a mild preference for one or another
course, but the preference might be overcome by evidence that most people do
not take that course. Some workers might think, for example, that they should
not enroll in a 401(k) plan and have a preference not to do so; but the thought
and the preference might shift with evidence that the employer has made
enrollment automatic. With respect to savings, the designated default plan
apparently carries a certain legitimacy for many employees, perhaps because
it seems to have resulted from some conscious thought about what makes
most sense for most people.76 This interpretation is supported by the finding
that the largest effects from the new default rule are shown by women and
African-Americans.77 We might speculate that members of such groups tend
to be less confident in their judgments in this domain and perhaps to have less
experience in assessing different savings plans.
2. Inertia. A separate explanation points to inertia.78 Any change from the default
rule or starting value is likely to require some action, and even a trivial action,
such as filling in some form and returning it, can leave room for failures due
to memory lapses, sloth, and procrastination. Many people wait until the last
minute to file their tax return, even though they are getting a refund. The
power of inertia should be seen as a form of bounded rationality. Although the
costs of switching from the default rule or the starting point can be counted as
transactions costs, the fact that large behavioral changes are observed even
when such costs are tiny suggests that a purely rational explanation is difficult
to accept.
3. Endowment effect. A default rule might create a “pure” endowment effect. It
is well known that people tend to value goods more highly if those goods have
search, experimentation, and data processing algorithms, and instead benefit from the cumulative
experience stored in the minds (and observed in the behavior) of others.”).
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been initially allocated to them than if those goods have been initially
allocated elsewhere.79 And it is well known that in many cases, the default
rule will create an endowment effect.80 When an endowment effect is
involved, the initial allocation, by private or public institutions, affects
people’s choices simply because it affects their valuations.
4. Ill-formed preferences. In the cases we have discussed, people’s preferences
are ill-formed and murky. Suppose, for example, that people are presented
with various payouts and risk levels for various pension plans. They might be
able to understand the presentation; there might be no confusion here. But
people might not have a well-defined preference for, or against, a slightly
riskier plan with a slightly higher expected value. In these circumstances, their
preferences might be endogenous to the default plan simply because they lack
well-formed desires that would trump it (whatever it is). In unfamiliar areas,
we believe that this situation is common. The range of values in the highway
safety study is likely a consequence of the unfamiliarity of the context, which
leaves people without clear preferences from which to generate numbers. The
effects of framing on intergenerational time preferences attests to the fact that
people do not have unambiguous judgments about how to trade off the
interests of future generations with those of people now living.
For present purposes, the choice among these various explanations does not
greatly matter. The central point is that effects on individual choices are often
unavoidable. Of course it is usually good not to block choices, and we do not mean to
defend non-libertarian paternalism here. But in an important respect, the anti-paternalistic
position is incoherent, simply because there is no way to avoid effects on behavior and
choices. The task for the committed libertarian is not to avoid such effects, but to
preserve freedom of choice.
Because framing effects are inevitable, it is hopelessly inadequate to say that
when people lack relevant information, the best response is to provide it. In order to be
effective, any effort to inform people must be rooted in an understanding of how people
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actually think. Presentation makes a great deal of difference; the behavioral consequences
of otherwise identical information depend on how it is framed. In the face of health risks,
for example, some presentations of accurate information might actually be
counterproductive, because people might attempt to control their fear by refusing to think
about the risk at all. In empirical studies, “some messages conveying identical
information seemed to work, better than others, and . . . some even appeared to
backfire.”81 When information campaigns fail altogether, it is often because those efforts
“result in counterproductive defensive measures,” in the form of efforts to reduce
cognitive dissonance by not thinking about the relevant hazard.82 Hence the most
effective approaches go far beyond mere disclosure and combine “a frightening message
about the consequences of inaction with an upbeat message about the efficacy of a
proposed program of prevention.”83
There are complex and interesting questions here about how to promote welfare.
If information greatly increases people’s fear, it will to that extent reduce welfare, in part
because fear is unpleasant, in part because fear has a range of ripple effects, producing a
wide range of social costs. We do not speak to the welfare issue here. Our only
suggestions are that if people lack information, a great deal of attention needs to be paid
to information-processing, and that without such attention, information disclosure might
well prove futile or counterproductive. And to the extent that those who design
informational strategies are taking account of how people think, and attempting to steer
people in desirable directions, their efforts will inevitably have a paternalistic dimension.
D. Beyond the Inevitable (But Still Libertarian)
The inevitability of paternalism is most clear when the planner has to choose
starting points, framing effects, or default rules. But if the focus is on welfare, it is
reasonable to ask whether the planner should go beyond the inevitable, and whether such
a planner can also claim to be libertarian. To illustrate the problem, return to the simple
80
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cafeteria example discussed above. Putting the fruit before the desserts is a fairly mild
intervention. A more intrusive step would be to place the desserts in another location
altogether, so that diners have to get up and get a dessert after they have finished the rest
of their meal. This step raises the transactions costs of eating dessert, and according to a
standard economic analysis the proposal is quite unattractive--it seems to make dessert
eaters worse off and no one better off. But many people face problems of self-control,
and these problems lead to health problems, small and large.84 Once the costs of selfcontrol are incorporated into the analysis, we can see that some diners would prefer this
arrangement, namely those who would eat a dessert if it were put in front of them but
would resist temptation if given a little help. To fit with libertarian principles, the planner
could arrange two lines in the cafeteria: the tempting line and the non-tempting line. The
tempting line would include everything, whereas the non-tempting line would make
unhealthy foods less available. Since people could choose either line, this passes the
libertarian test. (As a solution to the self-control problem, it might not be entirely
adequate, because people would be tempted to join to tempting line.) Hence it is possible
to preserve freedom of choice, and to allow opt-outs, but also to favor self-conscious
efforts to promote welfare by helping people to solve problems of bounded rationality
and bounded self-control. Efforts of this kind need not attempt to provide what people
would choose ex ante, even in cases in which preferences exist; but they would
nonetheless allow people to move in their preferred directions.
In the domain of employee behavior, there are many imaginable illustrations.
Employees might be automatically enrolled in a 405(k) plan, with a right to opt out, but
employers might require a waiting period, and perhaps a consultation with an adviser,
before the opt out could be effective. Thaler and Benartzi have proposed a method of
increasing contributions to 401(k) plans that also meets the libertarian test.85 Under the
Save More Tomorrow plan, briefly described in the Introduction, employees are invited
to sign up for a program in which their contributions to the savings plan are increased
annually whenever they get a raise. Once employees join the plan, they stay in until they
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opt out or reach the maximum savings rate in the plan. In the first company to use this
plan, the employees who joined increased their savings rates from 3.5 percent to 11.6
percent in a little over two years (three raises).86 Very few of the employees who join the
plan drop out. We believe that this is successful libertarian paternalism in action. In fact
the ideas of automatic enrollment and Save More Tomorrow provide more promising
models for increasing savings than recent (and far more expensive) proposals for doing
so by decreasing or eliminating taxes on savings.87
The same sort of strategy might be used in many domains. Moving from
paternalism to protection of third parties, employers (or the state) might seek to increase
charitable giving from workers. Is it possible to produce a form of libertarian
benevolence, and if so how might this be done? Moral suasion may or may not succeed,
but compare a system of Give More Tomorrow. Because workers appear quite willing to
depart with a fraction of their future raises, such a system, like Save More Tomorrow,
would be highly appealing to many people. In fact the ideas explored here might well be
used to produce significant increases in charitable donations (of course there are obvious
complexities about institutional design and appropriate default beneficiaries).
It should now be clear that the difference between libertarian and non-libertarian
paternalism is not simple and rigid. The libertarian paternalist insists on preserving
choice, whereas the non-libertarian paternalist is willing to foreclose choice. But in all
cases, a real question is the cost of exercising choice, and here there is a continuum rather
than a sharp dichotomy. A libertarian paternalist who is especially enthusiastic about free
choice would be inclined to make it relatively costless for people to obtain their preferred
outcomes. (Call this a libertarian paternalist.) By contrast, a libertarian paternalist who is
especially confident of his welfare judgments would preserve freedom of choice, but
would be willing to impose real costs on workers and consumers who seek to do what, in
the paternalist's view, would not be in their best interest. (Call this a libertarian
paternalist.) Rejecting both routes, a non-libertarian paternalist would attempt to block
certain choices. But notice that almost any such attempt will amount, in practice, to an
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effort to impose high costs on those who try to make those choices. Consider a law
requiring drivers to wear seat belts. If the law is enforced, and a large fine is imposed, the
law is non-libertarian even though determined violators can exercise their freedom of
choice – at the expense of the fine. But as the expected fine approaches zero, the law
approaches libertarianism. The libertarian paternalism that we are describing and
defending here attempts to ensure, as a general rule, that people can easily avoid the
paternalist's suggested option.88
E. Illustrations and Generalizations
Many actual and proposed legal provisions embody libertarian paternalism. Some
of those provisions require disclosure of information; some of them shift the default rule;
some of them preserve freedom of contract but impose procedural or substantive
restrictions on those who seek to move in directions that seem, to the planner, to be
contrary to their welfare. We divide this brief catalogue into two parts, the first dealing
with labor and employment law, and the second dealing with consumers more
generally.89
1. Labor and employment law. Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), employees are permitted to waive their rights at the time of retirement,90 and
hence the statutorily conferred right – to be free from age discrimination – does not reject
the libertarian commitment to freedom of contract. But the employee is presumed to have
that right unless there has been a “knowing and voluntary” waiver.91 To ensure that the
waiver is knowing and voluntary, the ADEA imposes a range of procedural hurdles. Thus
the waiver must specifically refer “to rights or claims arising under” the ADEA92; the
employee must be advised in writing to consult with an attorney before executing the
agreement93; the employee must be given “at least 21 days within which to consider the
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agreement”94; and the agreement must provide for a minimum of a seven day postexecution revocation period.95 The ADEA has an unmistakable paternalistic dimension
insofar as it switches the default rule to one favoring the employee and also creates a set
of procedural barriers to insufficiently informed waivers. At the same time, the ADEA
goes beyond inevitable paternalism through those very barriers, which significantly raise
the burdens of waiver. But the ADEA preserves freedom of choice and thus satisfies the
libertarian criterion.
Labor and employment law offers many other examples. The Model Employment
Termination Act alters the standard American rule to the effect that employees may be
discharged for no reason or for any reason at all.96 Under the Model Act, employees are
given the right to be discharged only for cause.97 But the Model Act complies with
libertarian principles by allowing employers and employees to waive the right on the
basis of an agreement, by the employer, to provide a severance payment in the event of a
discharge not based on poor job performance.98 That payment must consist of one
month’s salary for every year of employment. This limitation on waiver is substantive
and in that sense quite different from the procedural limitation in the ADEA; in that sense
it is less libertarian than it might be. But freedom of choice continues to be respected.
2. Consumer protection. In the law of consumer protection, the most obvious
examples of libertarian paternalism involve “cooling off” periods for certain decisions.99
The underlying rationale is that under the heat of the moment, consumers might make illconsidered or improvident decisions. Both bounded rationality and bounded willpower
are the underlying concerns. A mandatory cooling-off period for door-to-door sales, of
the sort imposed by the Federal Trade Commission in 1972,100 is a simple illustration.
Hence door-to-door sales must be accompanied by written statements telling buyers of
their right to rescind purchases within three days of transactions.101 Some states also
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impose mandatory waiting periods before people may receive a divorce decree.102 We
could easily imagine similar restrictions on the decision to marry, and some states have
moved in this direction as well.103 Aware that people might act impulsively or in a way
that they will regret, regulators do not block their choices, but ensure a period for sober
reflection. Note in this regard that mandatory cooling-off periods make best sense, and
tend to be imposed, when two conditions are met: (1) people are making decisions that
they make infrequently and for which they therefore lack a great deal of experience and
(2) emotions are likely to be running high. These are the circumstances – of bounded
rationality and bounded self-control respectively -- in which consumers are peculiarly
prone to making choices that they will regret.
3. Generalizations. We are now in a position to categorize a diverse set of
paternalistic interventions: minimal paternalism, coerced choices, procedural constraints,
and substantive constraints.
1. Minimal paternalism is that form of paternalism that occurs whenever a
planner (private or public) constructs a default rule or starting point with the
goal of influencing behavior. So long as it is costless or nearly costless to
depart from the default plan, minimal paternalism is maximally libertarian.
This is the form of paternalism that we have described as inevitable.
2. Unsure of what choices will promote welfare, a planner might reject default
plans or starting points entirely and force people to choose explicitly (what we
have described as the strategy of coerced choices). This approach finds an
analogue in information-eliciting default rules in contract law, designed to
give contracting parties a strong incentive to say what they want.104 In a sense,
planners who coerce choice are not paternalistic at all. But to the extent that
such planners force people to choose whether or not people would like to
choose, there is a paternalistic dimension to their actions. (“Choosing is good
for both freedom and welfare,” they appear to think, whether or not people
agree with them.)
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3. A slightly more aggressive form of paternalism occurs when the default plan
is accompanied by procedural constraints, designed to ensure that any
departure is fully voluntary and entirely rational. When procedural constraints
are in place, it is not costless to depart from the default plan. The extent of the
cost, and the aggressiveness of the paternalism, will of course vary with the
extent of the constraints. The justification for the constraints will depend on
whether there are serious problems of bounded rationality and bounded selfcontrol; if so, the constraints are justified not on the ground that the planner
disagrees with people’s choices, but because identifiable features of the
situation make it likely that choices will be defective. The Age Discrimination
in Employment Act is our principal example here.
4. Alternatively, a planner might impose substantive constraints, allowing people
to reject the default arrangement, but not on whatever terms they choose. On
this approach, the planner selects the terms along which the parties will be
permitted to move in their preferred directions. The Model Termination Act
and the Fair Labor Standards Act are illustrations. The extent of the departure
from libertarianism will be a function of the gap between the legally specified
terms and the terms that parties would otherwise reach. Here too the
justification for the constraint depends on bounded rationality and bounded
self-control.
5. A planner might reject freedom of choice on the ground that those who reject
the default plan will err all or almost all of the time. Such a planner will
impose significant costs on those who depart from the plan. As we have said,
there is a thin line between non-libertarian paternalists and libertarian
paternalists who impose high costs, procedural or substantive, on those who
reject the plan. Almost all of the time, the non-libertarian paternalist will
allow choosers, at some cost, to reject the proposed course of action. Those
who are required to wear motorcycle helmets can decide to risk the relevant
penalty, and to pay it if need be. Employers and employees might agree to
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subminimum wage work and risk the penalties if they are caught. In this
particular sense, penalties are always prices.
IV. How to Choose: The Toolbox of the Libertarian Paternalist
How should sensible planners (a category meant to include anyone who must
design plans for others, from human resource directors to bureaucrats to kings) choose
among possible systems, given that some choice is necessary? We suggest two
approaches to this problem. If feasible, a comparison of possible rules should be done
using a form of cost-benefit analysis. In many cases, however, such analyses will be both
difficult and expensive. As an alternative, we offer some rules of thumb that might be
adopted to choose among alternatives. In general, it makes sense to experiment with
possible approaches, to identify their results for both choices and outcomes. We have
emphasized automatic enrollment plans and Save More Tomorrow because studies have
suggested that both of these have a great deal of potential. In other domains, plans are
likely to be proposed in the face of highly imperfect information; more data will reveal a
great deal. Large-scale programs are most justified if repeated experiments have shown
that they actually work.
A. Costs and Benefits
The goal of a cost-benefit study would be to measure the full ramifications of any
design choice. In the context at hand, the cost-benefit study cannot be based on
willingness to pay (WTP), because WTP will be a function of the default rule.105 It must
be a more open-ended (and inevitably somewhat subjective) assessment of the values at
stake. To illustrate, take the example of automatic enrollment. Under automatic
enrollment, some employees will join the plan who otherwise would not. Presumably,
some are made better off (especially if there is an employer match) but some may be
made worse off (e.g., those who are highly liquidity constrained). A cost-benefit analysis
would attempt to evaluate these gains and losses.
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If the issue were only enrollment, we think it highly likely that the gains would
exceed the losses. Because of the right to opt out, those who need the money immediately
are able to have it. And in the abstract, it is reasonable to believe that the costs of having
too little saved up for retirement are typically greater than the costs of having saved too
much. Few people find that their welfare has been substantially diminished by excessive
savings. Empirical studies find that revealed choices do not undermine but support this
judgment. Most employees do join the plan eventually, and very few who are
automatically enrolled opt out when they figure out what has happened to them.106 It
would be possible to respond that our reliance on behavior as an indication of welfare is
inconsistent with one of the central claims of this Article, to the effect that choices do not
necessarily coincide with welfare. But there is no inconsistency. Compare rules calling
for mandatory cooling off periods. The premise of such rules is that people are more
likely to make good choices when they have had time to think carefully and without a
salesperson present. Similarly, it is reasonable to think that if, on reflection, workers
realized that they had been “tricked” into saving too much, they might take the effort to
opt out. The fact that very few participants choose to opt out supports (though it does not
prove) the claim that they are helped by a system that makes joining easy.
Once the other effects of automatic enrollment are included, the analysis becomes
cloudier. Any plan for automatic enrollment must include a specified default savings rate.
Some of those automatically enrolled at a three percent savings rate -- a typical default in
automatic enrollment -- would have chosen a higher rate if left to their own devices.107 If
automatic enrollment leads some or many people to save at a lower rate than they would
choose, the plan might be objectionable for that reason. Hence we are less confident that
this more complete cost-benefit analysis would support the particular opt-out system,
though a higher savings rate might well do so, and a more sophisticated plan, avoiding
some of these pitfalls, is discussed below.
Similar trade-offs are involved with another important issue: The appropriate
default rule for organ donations. In many nations -- Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Italy, Luxemburg, Norway, Singapore, Slovenia, and Spain -- people are
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presumed to consent to allow their organs to be used, after death, for the benefit of others;
but they are permitted to rebut the presumption, usually through an explicit notation to
that effect on their drivers’ licenses.108 In the United States, by contrast, those who want
their organs to be available for others must affirmatively say so, also through an explicit
notation on their drivers’ licenses. The result is that in “presumed consent” nations over
90 percent of people make their organs available for donation, whereas in the United
States, the corresponding number is below 20 percent.109 We hypothesize that this
dramatic difference is not a product of deep cultural differences, but of the massive effect
of the default rule. Hence we would predict that a European-style default rule, in the
United States, would produce European-level donation rates.
The default rules for organ donation do not fit the usual definition of paternalism.
The issue is the welfare of third parties, not of choosers. Here we are speaking not of
libertarian paternalism, but of libertarian benevolence: An approach that attempts to
promote benevolence, and to assist vulnerable people, without mandating behavior in any
way. We suggest that changes in default rules, or a system of Give More Tomorrow,
could produce large increases in public assistance – and that such approaches could do so
in a way that avoids coercion. With respect to behavior, the analysis of libertarian
benevolence is quite similar to that of libertarian paternalism. One of the advantages of
that analysis is the demonstration that when third party interests are at stake, the default
rule will matter a great deal. It follows that planners can often deliver significant benefits
to third parties not by coercing choice, but by switching the default rule. In the case of
organ donation, this is what we observe.
Does one or another default rule promote welfare? At first glance, the European
rule seems much better, simply because it should save a large number of lives without
compromising any other important value. The most that can be said against the European
rule is that through inertia, perceived social pressure, or confusion, some people might
end up donating their organs when they would not, all things considered, prefer to do so
ex ante. (Their ex post preferences are difficult to infer!) If this objection (or some
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other110) seems forceful, an alternative would be to adopt the coerced choice approach –
to require, at the time of applying for a driver’s license, that applicants indicate whether
they want to allow their organs to be used for the benefit of others. We make only two
claims about this example. First, the evaluative question turns in large part on empirical
issues, of the sort that it would be both possible and useful to investigate. Second, the
American approach is unlikely to be best.111
B. Rules of Thumb
In many cases, the planner will be unable to make a direct inquiry into welfare,
either because too little information is available, or because the costs of doing the
analysis are not warranted. The committed anti-paternalist might say, in such cases, that
people should simply be permitted to choose as they see fit. We hope that we have said
enough to show why this response is unhelpful. What people choose often depends on the
starting point, and hence the starting point cannot be selected by asking what people
choose. In these circumstances, the libertarian paternalist would seek indirect proxies for
welfare – methods that test whether one or another approach promotes welfare without
relying on unreliable guesswork about that question. We suggest three possible methods.
First, the libertarian paternalist might select the approach that the majority would
choose if explicit choices were required and revealed. In the context of contract law, this
is the most familiar inquiry in the selection of default rules112—provisions that govern
contractual arrangements in the absence of express provision by the parties. Useful
though it is, this market-mimicking approach raises its own problems. Perhaps the
majority’s choices would be insufficiently informed, or a reflection of bounded
rationality or bounded self-control. Perhaps those choices would not, in fact, promote the
majority’s welfare. At least as a presumption, however, it makes sense to follow those
110
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choices if the planner knows what they would be. A deeper problem is that the majority’s
choices might themselves be a function of the starting point or the default rule. If so, the
problem of circularity dooms the market-mimicking approach. But in some cases, at
least, the majority might go one way or the other regardless of the starting point; and to
that extent, the market-mimicking strategy is workable. Recall that in the cafeteria
example, some options would not fit with the majority’s ex ante choices (hot asparagus
pie, peanut butter soup), and that for savings, some allocations would certainly violate the
choices of ordinary workers (say, an allocation of 30 percent or more to savings). In fact
a clear understanding of majority choices might well support a default rule that respects
those choices even if the planner thinks that an inquiry into welfare would support
another rule. At the very least, planners should be required to have real confidence in
their judgment if they seek to do something other than what a suitably informed majority
would find to be in its interest.
Second, the libertarian paternalist might select the approach that we have called
coerced choices, one that would force people to make their choices explicit. This
approach might be chosen if the market-mimicking strategy fails, either because of the
circularity problem or because the planner does not know which approach would in fact
be chosen by the majority. We have seen the possibility of forced choices in the context
of retirement plans and organ donations; it would be easy to multiply examples. In the
law of contract, courts sometimes choose “penalty defaults” – default rules that penalize
the party in the best position to obtain a clear statement on the question at hand, and
hence create an incentive for clarity for the person who is in the best position to produce
clarity.113 Libertarian paternalists might go along the same track; in fact penalty defaults
can be seen as a form of libertarian paternalism.
Here too, however, there is a risk that the choices that are actually elicited will be
inadequately informed or will not promote welfare. In the case of retirement plans, for
example, forced choices have been found to produce higher participation rates than
requiring opt-ins, but lower rates than requiring opt-outs.114 If it is likely that automatic
enrollment promotes people’s welfare, perhaps automatic enrollment should be preferred
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over forced choices. The only suggestion is that where social planners are unsure how to
handle the welfare question, they might devise a strategy that requires people to choose.
Third, the libertarian paternalist might select the approach that minimizes the
number of opt-outs. Suppose, for example, that when drivers are presumed to want to
donate their organs to others, only 10 percent opt out – but that when drivers are required
to signal their willingness to donate their organs to others, 30 percent opt in. This is an ex
post inquiry into people’s preferences, in contrast to the ex ante approach favored by the
market-mimicking strategy. With those numbers, there is reason to think that the
presumption in favor of organ donation is better, if only because more people are
sufficiently satisfied to leave it in place.
V. How Much Choice Should Be Offered?
Sweden recently adopted a partial privatization of its social security system along
similar lines to those now being suggested in the United States: 2.5 percent of the payroll
tax is invested in individual accounts.115 The designers of this plan made two decisions
that we think would draw the approval of most anti-paternalists. First, all money
managers that met certain fiduciary conditions were permitted to have their funds be
included among those offered to participants.116 Second, although a default investment
portfolio was designated for those participants who did not select one for themselves,
participants were urged (via a massive publicity campaign) to eschew the default and
instead to select their own portfolios.117 As a result of these two choices, there were over
450 funds in the plan, and very few Swedes selected the default option.118 It is too soon to
judge how well the participants did at choosing their portfolios, but we do know that the
largest market share (about 5 percent) was invested in a fund that invested primarily in
Internet stocks.119
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We outline the Swedish experience to illustrate a more general question. How
much choice should people be given? Libertarian paternalists want to promote freedom of
choice, but they need not seek to provide bad options, and among the set of reasonable
ones, they need not argue that more is necessarily better. Indeed that argument is quite
implausible in many contexts. With respect to savings plans, would hundreds of
thousands of options be helpful? Millions? Thirty years ago, most academics had only
two investment options in their retirement plan, TIAA and CREF. Now most universities
offer more than one provider and often dozens, if not hundreds, of funds from which to
choose. Some of the relevant plans, designed to be readily intelligible, seem impossibly
complicated even to moderately well-informed academics (one of us speaks from
personal experience). Do participants gain from this increase in their choice set? In a
standard economic analysis this is a non-question. It is a basic axiom of rational choice
theory that more choices cannot make people worse off (at least abstracting from the
costs of making the decision). But a complete analysis, informed by the research on the
psychology of decision making, is more complicated. It is certainly possible that 450 is
more than the optimal number of funds to offer in a system of individual accounts.
Indeed, one recent study finds that when 401(k) plans offer more choice, participants are
slower to join, perhaps because they are overwhelmed by the number of choices and
procrastinate.120
It is far beyond our ambition here to venture a full analysis of the question how
much choice to offer individuals in various domains.121 Instead, we identify some
questions that a libertarian paternalist might ask to help decide how much (reasonable)
choice to offer. Two general considerations are relevant: the costs of decisions and the
costs of errors. When a number of options increases the costs of decisions, there is reason
to reduce the number of options -- a reason that might be overcome if that number makes
it more likely that people will make choices that increase their welfare. It follows that
numerous options are more likely to be preferred if they will lead to welfare-promoting
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decisions for many or most (and hence reduce error costs). The more particular questions
we introduce are a way of specifying the inquiry into decision costs and error costs. Our
analysis is directly relevant to debates about retirement plans and the privatization of
social security; in the latter context, it raises doubts about the idea that workers would
benefit from an extremely wide range of choices.122
1. Do choosers have informed preferences? In some domains, consumers and
workers are highly informed – so much so that they will not even be influenced by
default rules. Most adults have experimented enough over the course of their lives to
have a good sense of what flavors of ice cream they like. They can do a decent job of
picking even in a shop offering dozens of flavors. If the default option is asparagusflavored ice cream, they will be unlikely to choose it, and might well be annoyed. But
when faced with a menu listing many unfamiliar foods in a foreign country, people might
not be benefited by being asked to choose among them, and they might prefer a small list
or ask the waiter for a default suggestion (e.g., what do other tourists like?). Clever
restaurants catering to tourists often offer a default “tourist menu.” Many actual choices
fall between the poles of ice cream flavors and foreign menus. When information is
limited, countless options increase the costs of decisions without increasing the likelihood
of accuracy. But when choosers are highly informed, numerous options decrease the
likelihood of error and do not greatly increase decision costs, simply because informed
choosers can more easily navigate the menu of options.
2. Is the mapping from options to preferences transparent? If we order a coffee
ice cream cone, we have a pretty good idea what we will consume. If we invest $10,000
in a mix of mutual funds, we have little idea (without the aid of sophisticated software)
what a change in the portfolio will do to our distribution of expected returns in
retirement. When we choose between health plans, we may not fully understand all the
ramifications of our choice. If I get a rare disease, will I be able to see a good specialist?
How long will I have to wait in line? When people have a hard time predicting how their
choices will end up affecting their lives, they have less to gain by numerous options and
perhaps even by choosing for themselves. If it is hard to map from options to preferences,
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a large set of choices is likely to be cognitively overwhelming, and thus to increase the
costs of decisions without also increasing welfare by reducing errors.
3. How much do preferences vary across individuals? Some people smoke; others
hate the smell of smoke. Some people like hard mattresses; others like soft ones. How do
hotels deal with this problem? Most choose to cater to differences in tastes with respect to
smoking but not with respect to mattresses. The mattress that appeals to the median hotel
guest seems to be good enough to satisfy most customers, but the threat of a smoky room
(or a night without cigarettes) is enough to scare customers away. Here is a case in which
many people have well-formed preferences that trump default rules. Many planners, both
private and public, must make similar tradeoffs. Since offering choice is costly, sensible
planners make multiple choices available when people’s preferences vary most. The
argument for a large option set is thus strongest in cases of preferences that are both clear
and heterogeneous. In such cases, people’s welfare is likely to be promoted if each can
choose as he sees fit, and homogeneity will lead to inaccuracy and thus widespread error
costs.
4. Do consumers value choosing for themselves, per se? Freedom of choice is
itself an ingredient in welfare. In some situations people derive welfare from the very act
of choosing. But sometimes it is a chore to have to choose,123 and the relevant taste can
differ across individuals. (One of us derives pleasure from reading and choosing from a
wine list, the other finds that enterprise basically intolerable.124) The point very much
bears on the decision whether to force explicit choices or instead to adopt a default rule
that reflects what the majority wants. If making choices is itself a subjective good, the
argument for forced choices is strengthened. But much of the time, especially in technical
areas, people do not particularly enjoy the process of choice, and a large number of
options is a burden. By contrast, a thoughtfully chosen default rule, steering them in
sensible directions, is a blessing.
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VI. Objections
The argument for libertarian paternalism seems compelling to us, even obvious,
but we suspect that hard-line anti-paternalists, and possibly others, will have objections.
We respond to three possible objections here.
The first objection is that by advocating libertarian paternalism, we are starting
down a very slippery slope. Once one grants the possibility that default rules for savings
or cafeteria lines should be designed paternalistically, it might seem impossible to resist
highly non-libertarian interventions. Critics might envisage an onslaught of what seem, to
them, to be unacceptably intrusive forms of paternalism, from requiring motorcycle riders
to wear helmets to mandatory waiting periods before consumer purchases to bans on
cigarette smoking to intrusive health care reforms of many imaginable kinds. In the face
of the risk of overreaching, might it not be better to avoid starting down the slope at all?
There are three responses. First, in many cases there is simply no viable
alternative to paternalism in the weak sense, and hence planners are forced to take a least
a few tiny steps down that slope. Recall that paternalism, in the form of effects on
behavior, is frequently inevitable. In such cases, the slope cannot be avoided. Second, the
libertarian condition, requiring opt-out rights, sharply limits the steepness of the slope. So
long as paternalistic interventions can be easily avoided by those who seek to adopt a
course of their own, the risks emphasized by anti-paternalists are minimal. Third, those
who make the slippery slope argument are acknowledging the existence of a self-control
problem, at least for planners. But if planners, including bureaucrats and human resource
managers, suffer from self-control problems, then it is highly likely that other people do
too.125
A second and different sort of objection is based on a deep mistrust of the ability
of the planner (especially the planner working for government) to make sensible choices.
Even those who normally believe that everyone chooses rationally treat with deep
skepticism any proposal that seems to hinge on rational choices by bureaucrats. Part of
124

A more serious example comes from evidence that many patients do not want to make complex medical
decisions and would prefer their doctors to choose for them. See Carl Schneider, The Practice of Autonomy
(1998).

40

the skepticism is based on a belief that bureaucrats lack the discipline imposed by market
pressures; part of it is rooted in the fear that well-organized private groups will move
bureaucrats in their preferred directions. We happily grant that planners are human,126
and thus are both boundedly rational and subject to the influence of objectionable
pressures. Nevertheless, as we have stressed, these human planners are sometimes forced
to make choices, and it is surely better to have them trying to improve people’s welfare
rather than the opposite. In emphasizing the important effect of plan design on choice (a
point underappreciated by economists, lawyers, and planners), we hope to encourage plan
designers to become more informed. And by arguing for a libertarian check on bad plans,
we hope to create a strong safeguard against ill-considered or ill-motivated plans.
A third objection would come from the opposite direction. Enthusiastic
paternalists, emboldened by evidence of bounded rationality and self-control problems,
might urge that in many domains, the libertarian position is quite implausible. At least if
the focus is entirely or mostly on welfare, it might seem clear that in certain
circumstances, people should not be given freedom of choice, for the simple reason that
they will choose poorly. In those circumstances, why should anyone insist on libertarian
paternalism, as opposed to unqualified or nonlibertarian paternalism?
This objection raises complex issues of both value and fact, and we do not intend
to venture into difficult philosophical territory here.127 Our basic response is threefold.
First, we reiterate our understanding that planners are human, and so the real comparison
is between boundedly rational choosers with self-control problems and boundedly
rational planners facing self-control problems of their own.128 It is doubtful that the
comparison can sensibly be made in the abstract. Second, an opt-out right operates as a
safeguard against confused or improperly motivated planners, and in many contexts, that
safeguard is crucial even if it potentially creates harm as well. Third, nothing we have
said denies the possibility that in some circumstances, it makes best sense to impose
significant costs on those who reject the proposed course of action, or even to deny
freedom of choice altogether. Indeed, the discussion in Part V can easily be developed
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into an account of what those circumstances are likely to be. The factors identified there
might well be taken as a basis for deciding whether and when to block choices. Our only
qualification is that when third party effects are not present, the general presumption
should be in favor of freedom of choice, and that presumption should be rebutted only
when individual choice is demonstrably inconsistent with individual welfare.129
Conclusion
Our goal here has been to describe and to defend libertarian paternalism – an
approach that preserves freedom of choice but that authorizes both private and public
institutions to steer people in directions that will promote their welfare. Some kind of
paternalism is likely whenever such institutions set out arrangements that prevail unless
people affirmatively choose otherwise. Our central empirical claim has been that in many
domains, people’s preferences are labile and ill-formed, and hence starting points and
default rules are likely to be quite sticky. In these circumstances, the goal should be to
avoid random, inadvertent, arbitrary, or harmful effects and to produce a situation that is
likely to promote people’s welfare, suitably defined. Indeed, many current social
outcomes are, we believe, both random or inadvertent, in the sense that they are a product
of default rules whose behavior-shaping effects have never been a product of serious
reflection.
When the direct welfare inquiry is too hard to handle, libertarian paternalists have
a range of alternatives. They might, for example, select an approach that would be sought
by the majority, that requires or promotes explicit choices, or that minimizes opt-outs.
We have also identified the factors that make it most sensible to increase the range of
options, in an effort to show that the relationship between choice and welfare presents
tractable empirical questions, and should not be resolved by dogmas, a priori arguments,
and definitions. In our view, libertarian paternalism is not only a conceptual possibility; it
also provides a foundation for rethinking many areas of private and public law.
128
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This is a necessary condition, not a sufficient one; believers in autonomy will not agree that welfarist
concerns override freedom of choice. We do not attempt to speak to the underlying debates here; libertarian
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